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Abstract 
 
In the early twentieth century, a range of writers produced visions of a socialist 
economy whose distinguishing characteristic was an allocation of resources using a 
‘technical’ perspective. In the 1930s, Oskar Lange took up the challenge of Ludwig von 
Mises’ claim of the ‘impossibility’ of constructing a socialist economy on such an 
engineering basis. He readily acceded to the need for efficiency calculations to be made 
in value terms rather than using purely natural or engineering criteria, but claimed that 
these values could emerge without a market for capital goods, and without private 
ownership of capital. Friedrich Hayek replied stressing the dynamic aspects of 
competition in the context of the capital market; the latter is to be seen as a discovery 
procedure wherein production possibilities must not be taken for granted. Thus, socialist 
calculation is impossible because of the absence of those markets for capital and risk 
that evaluate the success or failure of different investment decisions under capitalism. 
Appraising this debate, we emerge with two findings. First, Lange's contribution was 
based on a one-sided, static conception of the capitalist economy, and therefore of the 
construction of a socialist alternative. Second, the Austrian approach only 
surreptitiously concedes the key role of finance in its defence of the dynamic properties 
of capitalism. And yet it is the very gyrations and instability emerging from the 
financial sector in capitalism that was one of the central factors motivating the search 
for an alternative engineering method of allocation in the first place. The latter point 
invites us to reconsider the place of finance in various schools of economics in 
mainstream thinking. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Theoretical and political debates on the character of socialist planning and the so-called ‘law 
of value’ under socialism had emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and became an 
issue of significance in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution at the 1920s. The issues raised 
soon attracted the attention of the liberal thought of the period. In an essay published in 1920, 
Ludwig von Mises challenged socialist and engineering-technocratic schema stating that 
every attempt to abolish markets and money will result in economic disaster: the construction 
of a viable socialist economy is an impossible task.
1
 In fact, the aim of Mises’ theoretical and 
political intervention was not focused solely upon the nature of socialist economies. He was 
also concerned with all forms of state intervention, including that which was taking place in 
Austria and Germany at the time (though he approved of state subsidies to the opera). It was 
not, however, until the 1930s when Friedrich Hayek re-circulated Mises’ article that the 
socialist calculation debate actually started. The most famous reply came from two eastern 
European economists: the Romanian Abba Lerner and the Polish Oskar Lange. This paper 
will not go through the details of this debate but focus on the reasoning of two of the 
protagonists: Lange and Hayek. 
 Lange took up the challenge of Mises’ claim of the impossibility of constructing a 
socialist economy. He readily acceded to the need for efficiency calculations to be made in 
value terms rather than using purely natural or engineering criteria, but claimed that these 
values could emerge along lines consistent with neoclassical value theory, without the need 
for a market in capital goods and without private ownership over the means of production. 
Lange drew heavily upon the dominant neoclassical tradition to defend socialism, or at least 
to defend a version of it that he considered appropriate. Lange’s argument was that the 
neoclassical static form of equilibrium can be easily replicated by the socialist economy. The 
version of socialism he chose to refer to as his standard was rather a type of capitalism 
without capital markets. In this regard, Lange managed implicitly to set forth two important   
arguments. First, he showed that a version of mainstream thinking that underestimates the 
role of capital markets in capitalism can be utilized to defend the paradigm of central 
planners. Second, a system that had abolished private property over the means of production 
and therefore capital markets and finance not only could replicate the much advertised 
efficiency of capitalism but would also enhance economic stability. We must not forget that 
the debate takes place in the 1930s, when the consequences of the great depression were 
central in everyone’s mind. Taming the financial instability of the capitalist system without 
sacrificing economic efficiency would seem an appealing alternative to the free market 
system in a period when the latter was generating many unresolved contradictions. 
 Hayek along with the other Austrians understood very well the message of this 
critique. How could a liberal economist respond to a ‘neoclassical’ defence of the state 
ownership of the means of production? There was only one way out of this uncanny 
encounter: the conceptualisation of the capitalist economy must be clearly differentiated from 
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the neoclassical universe of perfect competition and static equilibrium. This departure was 
never clearly stated in the writings of Mises and Hayek and never properly emphasized. 
Hayek’s argument stressed the dynamic aspects of competition in the context of the capital 
market: market competition is to be seen as a discovery procedure wherein production 
possibilities must not be taken for granted but emerge from the process of competition in the 
context of the capital market. Thus, socialist calculation is impossible because of the absence 
of those markets for capital and risk that evaluate the success or failure of different 
investment decisions under capitalism. Efficient economic calculation is unthinkable in the 
absence of disequilibrium prices for capital and risk. 
  But here we encounter an unexpected twist. While Lange degraded socialism 
to a mere replication of capitalism’s efficiency achievements, Hayek implicitly realized the 
danger of undermining functional capitalist behaviour and therefore the nature of capitalist 
relations. If we see economic behaviour in capitalism as the outcome of capitalist social 
relations of power, then Hayek’s perspective renders capital markets as a central arena in the 
organization of capitalism as a system of exploitation. He also perceives every movement 
towards collective ownership of the means of production as a real threat to the reproduction 
of the logic of capitalism. In this sense, he implicitly ends up giving an unexpected 
endorsement to socialism that is much deeper and sophisticated than the superficial ‘defence’ 
of Lange: every serious state intervention in the capital market threatens to eliminate the 
capitalist spirit, making the existence of the system vulnerable in the context of the 
reproduction of its power relations. This last point gives us the chance to revisit the socialist 
calculation debate, interpreting finance as trauma for mainstream discussions. 
 
2. The background of the debate: the so-called 'market socialists' and the initial 
intervention of Mises in 1920 
 
The debate between the supporters of socialism and those of capitalism, long before the 
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was interlinked to another theoretical dispute: the one between 
the labour ('objective') and the ‘subjective’ theories of value. Nevertheless, this connection 
was not as straightforward as one might think: the defenders of socialism drew upon both 
theoretical traditions. In order to understand this we must have in mind two different issues. 
 On the one hand, as we shall see below, the established version of socialism in these 
debates (at least at the first decades of the twentieth century) was a society with state 
ownership of the means of production.
2
 If we assume that saving and borrowing take place 
only within the capitalist class (i.e., labourers do not save nor borrow), then this rather 
awkward version of socialism is close to a capitalism without capital markets, that is to say 
capitalism without finance. 
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 On the other hand, traditional Marxism (though not Marx himself) argued that the 
labour theory of value is prior to every possible type of economic and social organization 
(section 2.1); market socialists put forward the very same idea with regard to the neoclassical 
theory of value (section 2.2). Both of these traditions argued for an ontological primacy of 
each theory of value over the institutional configuration of society. Taking that for granted, 
the abovementioned model of socialism could, at least in principle, replicate the workings of 
capitalism because the equilibrium conditions could be specified and met without any 
reference to the price of capital. This was in fact the meeting point between the two different 
defences of this type of socialism, with their common focus on static theories of value. They 
both understated the role of finance in capitalism and implicitly accepted that there can exist 
institutional conditions which would enable the replication of capitalist economic efficiency 
in the absence of finance (that is, without any reference to the valuation of capital). In fact, 
the key issue in these discussions was not socialism, but capitalist finance. 
 
2.1 Socialism and labour theory of value: Mises vs. Traditional Marxism 
 
The Marxist tradition with few exceptions
3
 had adopted the viewpoint of the labour theory of 
value. This set up a specific perspective on both socialism and capitalism. Without going 
through the details of numerous analytical interventions we shall summarize the basic idea, 
referring primarily to the argument of Hilferding (1949).
4
 Traditional Marxism perceived 
capitalist social relations as extrinsic to labour itself; the latter thus retained ontological 
priority in the context of any type of social organization. From this point of view, traditional 
Marxism came to resemble a radical reading of Classical Political Economy (Smith and 
Ricardo), having abandoned Marx’s project to criticize it. Labour was understood as a 
transhistorical source of value pertaining to every possible social configuration, even to 
socialism itself. The only difference is that while in capitalism the value-creating character of 
labour remains hidden, in socialism it is openly manifested. ‘The difference between 
socialism and capitalism, then, aside from whether private ownership of the means of 
production exists, is understood essentially as a matter of whether labor is recognized as that 
which constitutes and regulates society – and is consciously dealt with as such – or whether 
social regulation occurs nonconsciously’ (Postone 1993: 60-1). With the transhistorical 
ontology of the labour theory of value taken for granted, the elimination of markets for the 
means of production does not actually pose any significant problem for the organization of 
economic life: the price system is still viable thanks to labour time calculations. 
 Having that in mind, we can understand why the reaction of Mises in 1920 was 
mostly waged against the proponents of the labour theory of value, especially in the German 
speaking world. In his thinking, the latter offered a thorough validation of every kind of 
radical state interventionist social experiment against the free market. And the problem for 
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him was not just Bolshevik Russia, but the very fact that these state intervention issues were 
gaining ground in Germany and Austria as well (see Hayek 1935a: 122). Therefore, the main 
theoretical enemies that appeared in the pages of Mises' paper were: Marx, Engels, Lenin, 
Trotsky, Kautsky, Neurath and Bauer; in other words, the ‘fathers’ of Marxism, the 
Bolshevik leaders and the leading authors of German Social Democracy. 
 Mises’ idea was simple. Following the established pattern in the literature, he equated 
socialism to the ownership of the means of production by the state. This was the dominant 
perspective on socialism, not only in heterodox discussions of the period but also in the 
debates in the years to come. Dwelling upon the Austrian tradition of Böhm-Bawerk, he 
argued that any movement towards socialism would be a disaster. Why? Because ‘rational 
production becomes completely impossible’ as soon as one gives up the conception of a 
freely established monetary price for the means of production (Mises 1935: 104). In other 
words, ‘every step that takes us away from private ownership of the means of production and 
from the use of money also takes us away from rational economics. [...] Socialism is the 
abolition of rational economy. [...] There is only groping in the dark’ (ibid.). From this point 
of view, finance (which coincides with capital markets in the absence of other forms of 
credit) is sine qua non for capitalism: the latter cannot function properly unless there is a 
price for capital. 
 According to Mises, economic rationality and efficiency is associated with the 
existence of a 'price' for capital. This price is a valuable economic parameter for the making 
of efficient choices between alternative economic plans. For Mises markets are not perfect. 
Monetary calculation, especially in the case of capital, ‘has its inconveniences and serious 
defects, but we have certainly nothing better to put in its place’ (ibid.: 109). However, 
economic life cannot afford to part with this type of imperfection – it cannot be conceived in 
the absence of the capital market. It is meaningless to speak of prices in general and 
economic action when there are no indicators of expected profitability. The latter presupposes 
a market for capital and therefore finance. Hence, the crucial role of finance is not only to 
channel saving to investment; even more importantly, its role is to measure the efficiency of 
capital when the future is not known.
5
 
 
2.2 Market socialists: neoclassical theory of value as defence of socialism 
 
As we shall see below, Lange's intervention did not rely upon the labour theory of value but 
was rather heavily influenced by the so-called early 'market socialists'. Before discussing his 
viewpoint in section 3, we shall briefly mention two well known market socialists: Friedrich 
von Wieser and Enrico Barone. Both wrote at the end of the nineteenth century. Neither of 
them was a socialist, and socialism was not their central analytical preoccupation. Their 
interventions were mostly critiques directed at the labour theory of value and not at the 
possibility of realizing a central-planned economy (Lavoie 1985: 83). While they followed 
different methodological approaches, they both came to the same conclusion. They believed 
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that the newly founded subjective or marginalist theory of value had a validity that was 
independent and transcended any established social regime. In this sense, they adopted the 
same analytical premise as their opponents: they also believed that their value theory retained 
ontological priority over any institutional organization, or type of society. 
 Accordingly, the neoclassical theory of value must not be seen as a bourgeois 
apologia; it is not an enemy but an ally of the revolution. In Wieser's worlds, the marginalist 
approach to value is so little ‘a weapon against socialism, that socialists could scarcely make 
use of a better witness in favour of it’ (cited in Lavoie 1985: 82). Or to use Barone's 
formulations, ‘it is obvious how fantastic those doctrines are which imagine that production 
in the collectivist regime would be ordered in a manner substantially different from that of 
“anarchist” production’ (Barone 1935: 289). Although both authors made it clear that they 
did not write for or against socialism, they expressed serious doubts about the workability of 
a socialist system (Lavoie 1985: 83). They both put forward the notion that there exists a 
‘formal similarity’ (ibid.: 48) in the general logic of laws and choices that applies to either 
capitalism or socialism. This is the very same idea of similarity, coming from a different 
perspective this time, as the one we saw above with regard to the proponents of the labour 
theory of value. 
 This perspective sets forth the belief that socialism is just a peculiar form of 
'capitalism' governed by the same 'laws' of production and value. The only difference comes 
from the different structure of ownership over capital. Such conceptions of capitalism and 
socialism fail to grasp the most important aspect of capitalist societies, namely the nature of 
social power relations. Of course, some might argue that the 'collective' ownership of capital 
by itself amounts to a striking institutional shift in the organization of society. But, does this 
shift challenge the nature of the capitalist relations of exploitation and political domination? 
The answer is definitely no. The Soviet Union (like other manifestations of 'real-existing 
socialism') never ceased to be a class society. The ruling class was comprised of a layer of 
higher state and party officials on the one hand (who staffed both the political and the 
administrative-control mechanisms of the 'planned' economy that secured the collective/state-
capitalist appropriation of surplus value), and on the other, the managers of the state 
enterprises.
6
 The essential question surrounding socialism is not with the status of the 
ownership of capital but the nature of worker control over the social conditions of production 
and reproduction. We do not intend here to elaborate more on this question. But since the 
issue of the nature of capitalist power was left untouched in these discussions, the debate over 
capital as 'collective property' was not actually concerned with the building of socialism but 
indirectly touched upon the very role of capital markets and finance in capitalism. From this 
point of view, the main contributors in the socialist calculation debate were in fact 
discussing the importance of finance for capitalism in the name of central planning. In what 
follows we shall revisit the debate from this viewpoint. 
 In this regard, the real achievement of the market socialists was to defend the 
neoclassical theory of value against the labour value version of it and implicitly raise the 
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issue of finance. They unintentionally questioned the status that finance retains in the newly 
established neoclassical paradigm. And their initial answer underestimated this role; it 
rendered finance redundant and insignificant for the efficiency of production. After all, wasn't 
this the major outcome of the 'formal similarity' position? If the neoclassical law of valuation 
is independent of the institutional framework of the society, then the regulation of the supply 
and the demand of savings throughout the economy can be organized by a central planner, at 
least in principle. As we shall see below, in this line of thought the role of finance is totally 
redundant and insignificant since the optimization conditions must be met without any 
reference to the price of capital. To use Barone's reasoning, the central planning board can 
simply replace Walrasian auctioneering in the financial markets (Barone 1935). In fact, as we 
shall see below, this is the route followed by Lange. 
 
3. Lange's challenge to the mainstream: central planning board in the role of the 
Walrasian auctioneer 
 
Lange entered the socialist calculation debate in 1936 without actually making any new 
theoretical contribution. He drew heavily upon the issue of 'formal similarity' between 
socialism and capitalism from the perspective of market socialists: both presumed an 
ontological primacy of neoclassical value theory over both capitalism and socialism. In this 
sense, the neoclassical theory of value becomes a weapon for socialists and aids in the 
configuration of the socialist regime. The conception that had led Wieser and Barone ‘to 
doubt that socialism was impractical is extended by Lange to a practical analogy used to 
show that socialism is as practicable as capitalism’ (Lavoie 1985: 124). This point was raised 
against the Austrian critique. The challenge that Lange put forward against the neoclassical 
orthodoxy of the mid 1930s was simple but brilliant: socialism can easily imitate the 
efficiency of market capitalism if the central planning board is able to supplant the Walrasian 
tâtonnment process.
7
 
 As expected, the version of socialism defended by Lange was a form of economy with 
competitive markets for labour and consumption goods, but not for capital: ‘in the socialist 
system as described we have a genuine market (in the institutional sense of the word) for 
consumers' goods and for the services of labour [...] But there is no market for capital goods 
and productive resources outside of labour’ (ibid.: 61). With the assumption introduced in 
section 2 above, this is close to a version of capitalism without finance. In that case, the 
Walrasian trial-and-error process can be carried out even more efficiently by the central 
planning bureau than by a market process with private property; the bureau can replicate the 
role of finance in capitalism without giving up the optimization conditions associated with 
competitive capitalist markets: 
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there is not the slightest reason why a trial and error procedure, similar to that in a competitive 
market, could not work in a socialist economy to determine the accounting prices of capital 
goods and of the productive resources in public ownership. Indeed, it seems that it would, or at 
least could, work much better in a socialist economy than it does in a competitive market. For the 
Central Planning Board has a much wider knowledge of what is going on in the whole economic 
system than any private entrepreneur can ever have; and, consequently, may be able to reach the 
right equilibrium prices by a much shorter series of successive trials than a competitive market 
actually does (Lange 1936: 67; emphasis added). 
 
We can briefly summarize Lange's argument as follows.
8
 In an economy with no capital 
market, consumers are free to maximize their utility in the genuine markets for consumer 
goods. Nevertheless, capitalists, or rather managers of public firms, cannot be guided by the 
standard profit maximization rule since there is no market 'price' for capital. They have no 
basis on which to estimate the profitability prospects between alternative uses of a given 
amount of investment. According to Lange, this maximization condition can be replaced by 
two equivalent ones. This is the message of the canonical textbook microeconomics. On the 
one hand, profit maximization leads to optimum output when marginal cost (MC) meets the 
price (p) of the product (p=MC). This is the first rule to be met by managers. According to 
neoclassical theory, marginal benefit (p) must not exceed nor fall below marginal cost for the 
output to reach the optimum level. This rule can be satisfied without any calculation of 
profitability. On the other hand, the central planning bureau must also instruct the managers 
to choose a combination of factors that minimizes the average cost of production (ATC). In 
plain terms, this means that there are no profits above or below to normal level that would 
induce the producers to increase or decrease the level of production (or to induce inflow or 
outflow of capital from that branch of industry: the market is in equilibrium). Likewise, this 
condition can also be met without any knowledge of the profit rate and thus in the absence of 
capital markets. 
 The above argument has one important implication: the socialist economy of Lange 
can perfectly replicate the equilibrium position of neoclassical theory without any reference 
to the prices of capital and without any market for investment and saving. Capital markets 
and finance are redundant. In this respect, the result would be quite the same from a different 
theoretical route in the case of labour theory of value. In Lange's socialism there is an 
equivalent process of consumer's utility maximization while the profit maximization 
condition can be met by the abovementioned two complementary rules imposed upon firm 
managers. The central planner will announce shadow prices to the managers and they will 
accordingly apply the profit maximization conditions to production. They will request 
resources upon these prices for the expansion of production. If the result is suboptimum (it 
does not clear the market) the central planner will take this into account in the new price 
announcement. For Lange, the function of prices is a 'parametric' one: ‘although the prices 
are a resultant of the behaviour of all individuals on the market, each individual separately 
regards the actual market prices as given data to which he has to adjust himself. [...] Market 
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prices are thus parameters determining the behaviour of the individual’ (Lange 1936: 59). 
This parametric function of prices does not change with socialism; it is only the forms of the 
'equations' that change. The only difference is that the role of the Walrasian auctioneer will 
be carried out by the planning bureau, presumably in a more efficient way than under 
capitalism. The equilibrium values of these parameters will be still determined by the 
‘objective equilibrium conditions'. As ‘Walras has so brilliantly shown this is done by a series 
of successive trials (tâtonnements). [...] Thus the accounting prices in a socialist economy can 
be determined by the same process of trial and error by which prices on a competitive market 
are determined’ (ibid.: 59, 66). 
 At the end, Lange's defence of socialism is weak. His conclusion is that the economy 
outlined in his model can become as efficient as capitalism. Since finance has no role to play 
in the neoclassical universe, its functioning can thus be replicated by the central planning 
board leading to the very same outcome. Nevertheless, this is not much of a defence of 
socialism, since it functions merely as an indirect critique of the canonical neoclassical 
argument. There could be an alternative reading of Lange’s point: since the capital market is 
insignificant in the organization of capitalism and the establishment of competitive 
equilibrium, then socialism as a regime of public ownership of the means of production can 
become a real economic alternative. In fact the real contribution of the market socialist 
approach was not a genuine defence of socialism but a brilliant critique of mainstream 
thinking, which was unable to grasp the importance of capital markets and finance. This 
challenge triggered the reaction from the Austrian economists. In fact, as we shall argue in 
the next section 4, Hayek’s critique against market socialists was also a way of emphasizing 
the central role of finance in capitalism, which in his view cannot be supplanted by any 
concentrated bureau or institution. It is this latent aspect of the debate that has passed 
unnoticed in the literature. 
 
4. Hayek’s contribution to the debate: why capitalism is unthinkable in the absence of 
finance 
 
The engagement of the Austrians in the socialist calculation debate at the 1930s gave them an 
opportunity to refine and publicize their viewpoint with regard to the nature of capitalism. In 
fact, as Kirzner (1992: 100) suggests, this debate was ‘important as a catalyst in the 
development and articulation of the modern Austrian view of the market’. The Austrians, and 
Hayek in particular, critically distanced themselves from the established neoclassical 
orthodoxy of the era (the so-called model of perfect competition) while remaining strong 
proponents of the market system. In a sense, their response to the market socialists was an 
effort to defend the spirit of capitalism in the era of the ‘great transformation’ (to use 
Polanyi's well-known expression; Polanyi 2001), in which significant state interference with 
the economy, in its different versions was becoming a dominant paradigm of governance. In 
what follows we shall focus solely on Hayek’s contribution to the Austrian view of the 
debate. While the latter continued to emphasize and develop his perspective throughout the 
post Second World War period, the socialist calculation debate revealed an aspect of his 
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argumentation that remained, to a significant extent, veiled in his later interventions: the 
crucial role of finance. 
 Hayek first continued in the spirit of von Mises’ argumentation. Nevertheless, the 
context of the discussion has changed: it is not labour theory of value any more but the 
neoclassical value theory that is the fulcrum of debate. The proponents of socialism (in this 
debate) had adopted the ‘tools’ of the enemy in order to make their own point. Hayek uses 
Lange's definition of socialism as his point of reference, admitting that ‘it is essentially in this 
form that Marxism has been interpreted by the social-democratic parties on the Continent, 
and it is the form in which socialism is imagined by the greatest number of people’ (Hayek 
1935a: 18). His argument can be seen as a wider criticism not only of other ‘loose’ ideas of 
socialism (ibid.: 20)
9
 but also of the heart of the neoclassical static conception of equilibrium. 
Hayek understands very well that market socialists draw upon the fallacies of the 
dominant neoclassical paradigm. In fact, it is rather the latter that is the target of his critique. 
He fully grasps the fact that a thorough defence of an unstable capitalist system cannot come 
from its elevation in the form of the standard neoclassical model of perfect competition and 
static equilibrium. The market system is not perfect but it is the only path to meaningful 
economic organization. In what follows, we shall reproduce the parts of his reasoning that we 
consider as most important. The central point is based upon a certain empiricist conception of 
knowledge: it cannot be aggregated and cannot be 'produced' in the absence of capitalist 
competition, with emphasis on the second part of the argument. In an alternative formulation, 
the required knowledge of the existing 'objective' production possibilities will not be 
available to anyone without competitive capital markets, even if one could collect and 
aggregate all the decentralized information spread throughout the economy, because it is only 
through the process of competition that these processes emerge.  Hence, every negation of 
competition will lead to inferior results in terms of efficiency. No other economic regime can 
replicate or imitate the success of competitive free-market capitalism.
10
 
 For Hayek, 'maximization' and 'efficiency' are indeed the basic and proper economic 
aims but ‘the real economic problem which society faces (...) it is a problem of the utilization 
of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality’ (Hayek 1945: 519-520). The issue involved 
with the concept information or knowledge is a double one. No economic regime, including a 
socialist one, ever reaches a static equilibrium. The character of every economic 
configuration is dynamic, rather that static. It is indeed characterized by genuine 
disequilibrium: changes are frequent and unpredictable both in capitalism and socialism; and 
equilibrium is never actually attained. Therefore: 
 
all action will have to be based on anticipation of future events and the expectations on the part 
of different entrepreneurs will naturally differ. The decision to whom to entrust a given amount 
of resources will have to be made on the basis of individual promises of future return. Or, rather, 
it will have to be made on the statement that a certain return is to be expected with a certain 
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degree of probability. There will, of course, be no objective test of the magnitude of the risk. But 
who is then to decide whether the risk is worth taking? The central authority will have no other 
grounds on which to decide but the past performance of the entrepreneur. But how are they to 
decide whether the risks he has run in the past were justified? And will its attitude towards risky 
undertakings be the same as if he risked his own property? (Hayek 1935b: 233-4). 
 
According to Hayek, unlike the imaginary neoclassical universe, real life decisions are made 
upon the basis of expected unknown future incomes. We can attach ‘certain degrees of 
probability’ to the latter but at the end there is no ‘objective’ measure of risk. This poses a 
much more difficult economic problem than the one usually acknowledged. It is one thing to 
address the difficulty the central planner has in collecting the immense amount of information 
needed in order to carry out the task of effective planning.  But there is also ‘another problem 
of even greater importance’ (Hayek 1935b: 210: 154) and obviously more fundamental. The 
dispersed technical knowledge that the central lanner is supposed to collect does not even 
exist in the first instance (ibid.: 210-211). It is of course ‘absurd’ to assume that all this 
knowledge can be ‘concentrated in the heads of one or at best a very few people who actually 
formulate the equations to be worked out’ (ibid.). But even if there was a way to collect this 
knowledge and implant it in a single mind the more fundamental problem that would be 
encountered is that ‘much of the knowledge that is actually utilized is by no means “in 
existence” in this ready-made form’ (ibid.). In other words, the market competitive process 
not only disseminates existing decentralized knowledge (dispersal or communication of 
knowledge) but more importantly it contributes to its very production (the learning or 
discovery process).
11
 In other words, competition not only helps in discovery, but actually 
generates in the first place much of the knowledge to be subsequently dispersed. It is usually 
the dispersal of knowledge aspect of Hayek's reasoning that is emphasized in the secondary 
literature. Nevertheless, it is the first one (discovery) that is crucial in the understanding of 
the full message of Austrian tradition (see Kirzner 1992: 139-140). 
 What are the implications of the above reasoning in the case of capitalism without a 
market for the factors of production? As we read in the above passage, future investment 
choices in any type of economy rely upon expectations of future circumstances. Such 
expectations encompass a certain anticipated return combined with a degree of confidence 
(probability) in its achievement. No economic action with regard to the future can be 
undertaken if there does not exist some estimation of risk. This estimation cannot be 
objectively known. It is thus open to change and revision. Yet market information is the only 
meaningful indication available to the entrepreneur or anyone else for deciding upon future 
economic events and embarking upon investment projects. The entrepreneur’s subjective 
decisions concerning investment and risk-taking will thus be made taking into consideration 
existing prices for capital and risk which, for all their defects, represent the best information 
available as a basis for decision-making. 
In this fashion, market prices are disequilibrium prices, in the sense that as signals or 
communicators they are far from optimal performers. This conclusion also holds for prices of 
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capital and for risk. Instead of informing economic actors of the 'correct' path to follow, they 
offer incentives and disincentives that motivate them to explore and discover for themselves 
the true profitable alternatives. To put it simply, prices under competitive markets do not only 
spread information already discovered and given; they motivate the very discovery process. 
In their absence, this type of motivation will cease to exist. Therefore, even if someone 
manages to collect and concentrate all the existing information at any point in time it will be 
worthless because the negation of competition will significantly impoverish the real content 
of that information.
12
 
 This aspect of Hayek’s argumentation was not so clear in his writings of 1930s and 
1940s. Probably he was not fully aware of the consequences of his problematic. Perhaps he 
hesitated for tactical reasons to attack directly and thoroughly the neoclassical orthodoxy as 
well. But Hayek did not fail entirely to emphasize it. The competitive market process is 
reliant on market data at any particular point of time in the sense that: 
 
provisional results from the market process at each stage alone tell individuals what to look for. 
Utilisation of knowledge widely dispersed in a society with extensive division of labour cannot 
rest on individuals knowing all the particular uses to which well-known things in their individual 
environment might be put. Prices direct their attention to what is worth finding out about market 
offers for various things and services. [...] We shall see that the fact that a high degree of 
coincidence of expectations is brought about by the systematic disappointment of some kind of 
expectations is of crucial importance for an understanding of the functioning of the market order. 
[...] Competition is essentially a process of the formation of opinion [...] It creates the views 
people have about what is best and cheapest, and it is because of it that people know at least as 
much about possibilities and opportunities as they in fact do. [...]Yet this knowledge which is 
assumed to be given to begin with is one of the main points where it is only through the process 
of competition that the facts will be discovered (Hayek 1948a: 106, 95; Hayek 1978: 181, 185). 
 
In other words, markets do not only disseminate (imperfect) information but primarily 
motivate economic actors to conform with specific economic behaviour. As Kirzner (1992: 
160) summarizes: ‘the importance of prices for coping with the Hayekian knowledge problem 
does not lie in the accuracy of the information which equilibrium prices convey concerning 
the actions of others who are similarly informed. Rather, its importance lies in the ability of 
disequilibrium prices to offer pure profit opportunities that can attract the notice of alert, 
profit-seeking entrepreneurs. Where market participants have failed to co-ordinate their 
activities because of dispersed knowledge, this expresses itself in an array of prices that 
suggests to alert entrepreneurs where they may win pure profits’. In plain terms, economic 
actors are living in a disequilibrium and uncertain world. The market system is the only tool 
they have to aid in calculations about the unwritten future. Efficient economic calculation is 
unthinkable in the absence of disequilibrium prices of capital and for risk. It was this point 
that was overlooked by the market socialists when they adopted the conception of perfect 
competition (Hayek 1948b: 188). In the absence of competitive markets there will cease to 
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exist the capitalist spirit of action. From this point of view any state interference with the 
market is a serious threat to the latter. 
 
5. In the place of an epilogue: finance as 'trauma' in the mainstream thinking 
 
We can summarize the main findings of the above analysis as follows. Lange drew heavily 
upon the dominant neoclassical tradition to defend socialism, or at least to defend the version 
of it that he considered as appropriate. The neoclassical system emphasizes the static 
character of the economic equilibrium. The argument of Lange was that this static form of 
equilibrium can be easily replicated by the socialist economy. The version of socialism he 
chose to refer to as standard was rather a type of capitalism without capital markets. In this 
regard, Lange managed implicitly to set forth two important points. First, he showed that a 
version of mainstream thinking that underestimates the role of capital markets can be easily 
utilized to defend the social paradigm of central planners. Second, the abolition of capital 
markets – and therefore of finance – not only could replicate the much advertised efficiency 
of capitalism but would also achieve more economic stability. We must not forget that the 
debate takes place in the 1930s, when the consequences of the great depression were central 
in everyone’s mind. Taming the financial instability of the capitalist system without 
sacrificing economic efficiency would seem an appealing alternative to the free market 
system in a period that the latter was generating many unresolved contradictions. 
We must mention here that in the German speaking discussions there was an on-going 
debate on the role of the stock and commodity exchanges with regard to speculation and 
instability at least from the late 1880s. ‘Debate in Germany over the nature and social impact 
of stock and commodity exchanges had first grown acrimonious in the wake of the major 
economic downturn of 1873-1879, which put an end to the boom times of the Empire’s 
“founding era”, as well as the rather spectacular charges of political manipulation and 
collusion levelled at Bismarck and the German financial elite by a range of conservative and 
socialist critics’ (Lestition 2000: 289). This debate − which opened the road for government 
legislation and committees of inquiry − attracted the attention of famous scholars: even Max 
Weber and Frederick Engels were engaged (see Weber 2000; Engels 1989). The main issue 
that had dominated public scene at the time was ‘whether it was possible or socially useful to 
regulate the kinds of “speculation” that were carried on at the exchanges’ (Lestition 2000: 
289). Market regulation, state intervention and socialism were on the public agenda for many 
different reasons. 
 Hayek along with the other Austrians understood very well the message of these 
critiques, the most stimulating of which was undoubtedly coming from the market socialists. 
How could a mainstream liberal economist respond to a neoclassical defence of the state 
ownership of the means of production? There was one way out of this uncanny encounter: 
they had to clearly differentiate their view of capitalism from the neoclassical ideal universe 
of perfect equilibrium. This departure was never clearly stated in the writings of Mises and 
Hayek (Kirzner 1992: 111) and never properly emphasized. Both writers were rather insecure 
in pushing their argument to its limits. Nevertheless, their argument amounts to the strongest 
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defence of the market system that one can articulate. For when they defended the free market 
system they not only responded to the proponents of socialism but also to everyone who had 
argued for strong state interference in the workings of the economy. It was not just socialism 
but every alternative 'half way house' which would negate to some extent the decentralized 
market system. Or to put it differently it was not just Stalin as a central planner, but also 
Hitler as a fascist dictator and Roosevelt as a democratic “New Dealer” who were the objects 
of this critique. It was not just Lange and Lerner, but also Keynes and Kalecki, who were to 
be refuted. 
 In order to defend the market system, Hayek realized that he had to revise and 
criticise mainstream theory. Admittedly, the debate on socialist calculation triggered the 
process of elaboration and clarification of Austrian ideas (Kirzner ibid.). Against the 
challenge of the market socialists, Hayek actually highlighted the importance of the 
competitive market system primarily as a disequilibrium process. But since socialism, the 
debated concept, was perceived as a market system without capital markets, the debate 
implicitly touched upon the role of finance (under the simplifying assumption that only 
capitalists save and borrow). It was the role of finance in generating prices for risk that was 
obscured by the dominant neoclassical paradigm of perfect competition. From this point of 
view, Hayek’s argument can be seen as a suggestion that capitalism is unthinkable in the 
absence of finance, that is, without a market for risk. This is so because the pure market 
system provides the motives for economic actors to generate and discover the knowledge 
(‘alertness to and the discovery of as yet unknown information’ Kirzner 1992: 104) which is 
at the same time to be dispersed and communicated to other parts of the economy. 
In that sense, the real alternative to the market system is definitely not a process that 
can just collect the decentralized knowledge, because even if this were possible it would 
deprive the economic system of the proper motives to achieve efficient targets: it would not 
stimulate discovery and economic action according to the norms of the capitalist system. 
Markets disseminate imperfect information but also motivate discovery and learning; they 
generate the information to be communicated. From our point of view, although the Austrians 
never put it that way, this must be seen as a process of shaping economic behaviour 
according to the spirit of capitalism. For discovery and learning are just the outcomes of an 
active engagement in proper economic actions. The market system thus motivates a particular 
way of acting and it is only as a consequence of these actions that knowledge is discovered. 
From this perspective, the real message of Hayek's response to market socialists – an 
argument that was never properly stated during the period of the debate – was that capitalism 
needs the capital market to organize proper business behaviour and reproduce itself. With the 
establishment of central planning there will not be a ‘discovery process’ on the part of 
managers, hence no proper capitalist behaviour and therefore no efficiency in capitalist terms. 
In the end, every serious restriction of capital markets threatens the reproduction of the 
capitalist spirit. 
 But here we encounter an unexpected twist. While Lange degraded socialism to a 
mere replication of capitalism’s efficient achievements, Hayek implicitly realized the danger 
of undermining capitalist behaviour and thus the nature of capitalist relations. If we see 
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capitalist behaviour as the outcome of the capitalist social relations of power, then Hayek’s 
perspective renders capital markets central in the organization of capitalism as a system of 
exploitation. He also perceives at the same time every movement towards collective 
ownership of the means of production as a real threat to the logic of capitalist reproduction. 
In this sense, he implicitly ends up giving an unexpected endorsement to socialism that is 
much deeper and sophisticated than the superficial 'defence' of Lange: every thorough state 
intervention in the markets, and in the capital market in particular, threatens to eliminate the 
capitalist spirit, making the existence of the system vulnerable in the context of the 
reproduction of its power relations. 
 This last point gives us the chance to revisit the socialist calculation debate, 
interpreting finance as trauma for mainstream discussions. We shall use the concepts of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis as an analogy in order to clarify our point.
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 Of course, from a radical Marxian point of view, mainstream thinking in all its 
versions is just a theoretical ideology (using the Althusserian definition of the term; see 
Althusser and Balibar 1997): mainstream ideas misinterpret capitalist reality, but not in an 
arbitrary way. These systematic ideas are always interwoven with particular capitalist 
exploitation strategies stemming from reality itself. Mainstream theory systematizes ideas 
and perceptions that arise and are held in place by social and economic power relations 
themselves (the “given” ideological representations of everyday “experience”) without 
transforming their ideological content. Nevertheless, there is one more issue involved here. 
Mainstream economic reasoning always had the problem of properly incorporating finance 
and thinking seriously about financial instability and crises. It seems that finance besides a 
mystery has always been a trauma for the mainstream economic edifice. 
 Mainstream thinking offers an interpretation of the capitalist system by symbolizing 
capitalist reality in a particular way. It sets forth and reproduces practises containing 
particular symbols, ideas, concepts, questions and visions that all together comprise what we 
may call as the symbolic “misrecognition” of reality. Nevertheless there is one element that 
resists this symbolization and will always do so for mainstream analytical speculations: 
finance. It is not that mainstream thinking does not have theories of finance; it is that these 
theories are unable to grasp the fundamental aspects of finance, its crisis-prone character and 
its key role in the organization of capitalist production. The recent financial meltdown is an 
eloquent indication of this fact. The pre-crisis confidence in the strength of the system was 
accompanied by a post-crisis unease that led to fatal economic policy mistakes. In order 
words, finance is the real of capitalism, a place that cannot be properly symbolized, a factor 
that can never be completely absorbed into the mainstream ideological discourse. It will 
always be left over, unable to find its way to the established economic language, most 
especially in the contemporary forms of capitalism. 
 To speak metaphorically, the above argument suggests that finance is a trauma for the 
mainstream thinking. The socialist calculation debate manifests this idea very well indeed. 
The response of Lange was a provocative event, perhaps not deeply significant but in any 
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case an important focal point. It should remind mainstream economists that their neglect of 
finance as an active and creative force in capitalist reproduction can be easily used as an 
argument for the negation of the market system. The reaction of the Austrians was a result of 
the existence of this trauma as it was brought back into the conscious memory. But since the 
unsymbolized real cannot intrude into reality without the breakdown of the capitalist 
apologia, the argument of the Austrians played the role of fantasy for the mainstream 
thinking. It became the last defence against the traumatic encounter with the real; that is to 
say with finance as manifestation of the exploitative and contradictory character of the 
system. This is the true contribution of the Austrian tradition to mainstream thinking. This 
tradition will always be mentioned as a defensive argument of last resort for the free market 
system when the latter is in crisis, an imaginative context for capitalist apologia. It will 
always be the speculative border which cannot be crossed without serious consequences for 
the nature of economic reasoning purporting to defend the capitalist system. 
 
 
References 
 
Althusser, L. and Balibar, E. (1997) Reading Capital, London: Verso. 
Barone, E. ([1908] 1935) ‘The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State,’ in in F. A. Hayek 
(ed.) Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. 
Block, W., W. Barnett II, and S. Wood (2002) "Austrian Economics, Neoclassical Economics, and 
Finance," The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 5(2): 51-66. 
Engels, F. (1989) ‘The Socialism of Mr. Bismarck’, in K. Marx & F. Engels, Collected Works, vol. 
24, Marx and Engels: 1873-1874 (pp. 272-280), New York: International Publishers. 
Hayek, F. A. (1935a) "The Nature and the History of the Problem," in F. A. Hayek (ed.) Collectivist 
Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism, London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul Ltd. 
Hayek, F. A. (1935b) "The Present State of the Debate," in F. A. Hayek (ed.) Collectivist Economic 
Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism, London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul Ltd. 
Hayek, F. A. (1945) "The Use of Knowledge in Society," American Economic review, 35(4): 519-
530. 
Hayek, F. A. ([1946] 1948a) "The Meaning of Competition," in F. A. Hayek (ed.) Individualism and 
Economic Order, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Hayek, F. ([1940] 1948b) "Socialist Calculation III: The Competitive Solution," in F. A. Hayek (ed.) 
Individualism and Economic Order, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Hayek, F. A. ([1968] F1978) "Competition as a Discovery Procedure," in F. A. Hayek, New Studies in 
Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of ideas, London: Routledge. 
Hilferding, R. ([1904] 1949) ‘Böhm-Bawerk’s Criticism of Marx’, in P.M. Sweezy (ed.) ‘Karl Marx 
and the Close of His System’ by Eugen Böhm-Bawerk and ‘Böhm-Bawerk’s Criticism of 
Marx’ by Rudolf Hilferding, New York: Kelley. 
Kirzner, I. M. (1992) The Meaning of Market Process: Essays in the Development of Modern 
Austrian Economics, London and New York: Routledge. 
16 
 
Lavoie, D. (1985) Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Reconsider, New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Lestition, S. (2000) "Historical Preface to Max Weber, 'Stock and Commodity Exchanges'," Theory 
and Society, 29(3): 289-304. 
Milios, J., Dimoulis, D. and Economakis, G. (2002) Karl Marx and the Classics, An Essay on Value, 
Crises and the Capitalist Mode of Production, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Milios, J., and D. P. Sotiropoulos (2009) Rethinking Imperialism: A Study of Capitalist Rule, New 
York and Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 
Mises, L. ([1920] 1935) ‘Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commowealth,’ in F. A. Hayek (ed.) 
Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. 
Polanyi, K. (2001) The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 
Boston: Beacon Press Books. 
Postone, M. (1993) Time, Labour, and Social Domination, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sean, H. (2005) Jacques Lacan, London and New York: Routledge. 
Weber, M. ([1924] 2000) ‘Stock and Commodity Exchanges’, translated by S. Lestition, Theory and 
Society, 29: 339-371. 
Žižek, S. (2006) Lacan, London: Granta Books. 
 
 
